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ical literature is there a work similar to the *Theologische Jahresbericht*. From year to year, since its first volume was edited by the late Pünjer, in 1881, this excellent publication has gained in size and in value, its twenty-one contributors to the present volume belonging to the best representatives of theological science in Germany. The great care bestowed upon the work by the editors-in-chief, Holtzmann and Krüger, makes these twenty-one parts appear as if written by one and the same man; style, brevity, and conciseness, fairness of criticism, and freedom from all bigotry and prejudice, characterizing this unique annual report. Invaluable as a guide to the student at the present time, its importance will be immeasurably enhanced in the days of future generations.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. A Handbook for Students of Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Æsthetics, and General Philosophy. By OSWALD KÜLPE, Professor of Philosophy and Æsthetics in the University of Würzburg. Translated from the German (1895) by W. B. PILLSBURY, Instructor in Psychology in the Cornell University, and E. B. TITCHENOR, Sage Professor of Psychology in the Cornell University. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1897. Pp. x + 256. \$1.60.

THE volume before us is the latest addition to the list of valuable German philosophical works which have been made accessible to English readers by the labors of the philosophers of Cornell University. The significant feature of the present work is its method. There are two methods of writing an introduction to philosophy, says Professor Külpe. The first leads the reader "to *philosophize* by enumerating the principal philosophical problems and indicating their solution." Of this sort is Paulsen's *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. The second "is characterized by the author's desire to transcend the narrow limits of individual conviction and give the reader a bird's-eye view of the whole extent of philosophy, past and present." The first "may stimulate an occasional student to philosophic thought. . . . But if one is trying to get some real preparation for this study, to find out what has been done in the past . . . to understand the reasons for the divergence of the schools and the significance of the supreme effort of our own time toward the advancement of philosophic science—then recourse must be had to the second method." Accordingly the main body of the present work is devoted to a historical and

critical examination, first, of the boundaries of the several philosophical disciplines, and, secondly, of the schools of philosophy within these separate disciplines. Professor Külpe believes that, in a man's philosophic thought, we have to look rather for difference of tendency within the separate disciplines than for any unitary or all-embracing concept.

We find, therefore, no positive attempt on his own part to establish a system of philosophy. Such a system, he says, is impossible, owing to the heterogeneous character of the problems involved. These problems are (1) development of a comprehensive and consistent view of the universe; (2) investigation of the presuppositions of science; and (3) paving the way for new special sciences and special scientific knowledge. Within the separate disciplines he states and defends his preferences. In metaphysics he considers that the greatest probability is in favor of a dualism of matter and mind, the least in favor of materialism. Mechanism and finality are to rank as coördinate conceptions under the larger concept of causality. The results of his examination of theological metaphysics are purely negative; yet he conceives it the duty of metaphysics to "show the possibility of combining a theological hypothesis with all that we know of the universe from other sources." In epistemology he inclines to criticism—a position that admits the possibility of metaphysics, but not in dogmatic form. His position toward the world as known is that of phenomenism, which finds in experience both a subjective and an objective content.

The excellent manner in which Professor Külpe has carried out his plan of giving us "a bird's-eye view of the whole extent of philosophy" need not compel us to accept his estimate of its value as an *introduction* to philosophy. One who has already studied philosophy will welcome the opportunity here offered him of viewing the study as a whole; but the uninitiated, from a want of previous acquaintance with details, will find many chapters unintelligible. Professor Külpe has well described his book as a "guide to philosophy;" but it is like the mariner's chart, which guides the navigator, but not the landsman. He hardly explains the general distrust of philosophy by ascribing it to "ignorance of what philosophy is and has been." Even those familiar with its history and problems sometimes share the popular suspicion that the latter are the outcome of perverted ingenuity. This suspicion is rather the result of a failure to perceive any connection between the problems of philosophy and the world of "common sense" and natural science. A work that made this connection clear—for it can be made clear—

would be a most fitting introduction to philosophy, not merely for the college student, but for the whole community of educated men. Such a work should, as far as possible, avoid the expression of individual opinion, but in other respects its method would resemble that rejected by Professor Külpe.

WARNER FITE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE WILL TO BELIEVE, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.
By WILLIAM JAMES. New York, London, and Bombay :
Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. xvii + 332, 8vo. Cloth,
\$2.

THE contents of this volume do not belie its title. It is truly described as a series of "essays in popular philosophy." Whatever Professor James touches he popularizes, just because whatever he touches he humanizes. The same qualities of sympathetic insight, of poetic imagination, of subtle humor, of rare style, which are familiar to readers of the *Principles of Psychology*, characterize in an even more marked degree the present volume, and entitle it, even more unmistakably than its predecessor, to rank as literature. The charm of the author's personality pervades the book, and, whether we agree with his conclusions or not, we cannot help feeling that it is good for us to have made the acquaintance of such a soul as that which finds expression in it. Nor is the epithet "popular" to be interpreted in the sense which the author's modesty intends it to carry. Although the language is untechnical, the thought is severe in its logical sequence; and, although a brilliant fancy plays round the discussion, and relieves it of all scholastic dryness, the discussion itself always sounds the subject to its depths. Besides, while the volume consists of a series of papers already published at intervals extending over nearly twenty years, it represents a unity of standpoint and of treatment no less rich than if the essays had been written continuously and in the same year. The persistence with which Professor James has preached his philosophic creed from different texts through all these years can only add to the respect with which it is received by readers of the present volume.

That creed is entitled by the author himself "radical empiricism," and is opposed by him to "monism," whether of the gnostic or agnostic, of the idealistic or materialistic, sort. "I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experi-